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  2In the traditional theories of trade, the gains from trade are associated with
international specialization or with the availability of new varieties of goods.
In particular, Krugman (1980) has introduced monopolistic competition in the
trade literature emphasizing the endogenous increase in the number of products
purchased at a constant price after a country opens up to trade. The normative
theory of trade has mainly emphasized the optimality of import tariﬀs and
(typically) taxes on domestic exportables either to improve the terms of trade
(in the neoclassical theory) or for proﬁt shifting reasons (Eaton and Grossman,
1986). All these approaches neglect a fundamental consequence of trade, the
competitive impact of international entry on the strategic interactions between
ﬁrms and on the resulting international prices.1 This leads to a separate source
of gains from trade, which partially crowds out the traditional one, and to
diﬀerent and sometimes opposite conclusions on the optimal trade policy for
domestic, foreign and intergated markets. However, in spite of the pathbreaking
contribution by Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983), the main
implications of the endogenous market structures (EMSs) approach have not
been investigated in a systematic way: not by chance, leading international
trade economists (as Neary, 2010) talk about the existence of “two and a half
theories of trade.”2
The analysis of strategic interactions emphasizes that the gains from trade
are mainly associated with a reduction in the prices due to international compe 
tition. This separate source of gains from trade represents a sort of folk theorem
in international trade theory   see for instance Krugman (1979), Brander and
Krugman (1983) or more recently Lahiri and Ono (1995) and Peretto (2003)  
but its theoretical, empirical and welfare implications have not been fully an 
alyzed. We present a general model of the impact of trade integration on the
structure of markets with strategic interactions and endogenous entry and dis 
cuss in detail the case of homogenous goods and linear demand and the case
of isoelastic preferences ` a la Krugman (1980). As a ﬁrst impact, trade integra 
tion strengthens competition and induces a generalized reduction of the prices,
which is a primary source of gains from trade due to the competition eﬀect. As
1The neoclassical approach and the monopolistic competition approach do not consider
strategic interactions and most of the strategic trade literature takes them into account but
neglects endogenous entry.
2As well known, the analysis of EMSs in industrial organization has a wide tradition which
goes back at least to the work of Sutton (1991) and has been recently used to analyze multiple
issues, including the role of strategic investments (Etro, 2006) and exogenous shocks (Anderson
et al., 2010), incentive and ﬁnancial contracts (Etro, 2010a,b), investment in R&D (Kov´ aˇ c et
al., 2010; Erkal and Piccinin, 2010), growth (Peretto, 1996), business cycle theory (Devereux,
Head and Lapham, 1996; Etro and Colciago, 2010) and more. For important dynamic analysis
of trade issues see the recent works of Melitz (2003) and Atkeson and Burstein (2008, 2010).
1a second impact, the price reduction creates a negative feedback on proﬁtability
which crowds out the expansion of the number of produced varieties and leads to
business destruction at the local level: this reduces (or eliminates in case of ho 
mogenous goods) the traditional gains from variety ` a la Krugman and provides
an empirical discriminant between the monopolistic competition approach and
the EMS approach (tested in the Appendix with results in favor of the latter).
As a third impact, after trade integration the equilibrium market structure is
characterized by a larger production of each surviving ﬁrm: this increase in con 
centration is welfare enhancing because reduces the expenditure in ﬁxed costs,
which creates another source of gains from trade. In spite of these gains from
trade associated with price reduction and beneﬁcial concentration, the market
structure remains ineﬃcient because of the stategic interactions (Mankiw and
Whinston, 1986). In particular, there is a tendency toward excessive mark ups
and entry which opens the door to new roles for trade policy.
The analysis of international EMSs has important normative implications,
which are address here, as far as we know, for the ﬁrst time. When a domestic
ﬁrm is facing endogenous entry of international ﬁrms, the optimal tariﬀ balances
the beneﬁts from proﬁt shifting (still present in spite of free entry) and tariﬀ
revenues and the cost of the price increase: we derive the optimal tariﬀ (with
a closed form solution for a Cournot model with linear demand) and show that
this is decreasing in the ratio between size of the economy and ﬁxed entry
cost. The main role of the tariﬀ is to decrease entry of foreign ﬁrms, which
reduces the production ineﬃciency associated with the free trade equilibrium:
this creates space for increasing the market share and the proﬁts of the domestic
ﬁrm (compared to zero proﬁts in case of free trade), while collecting also some
tariﬀ revenue. These domestic beneﬁts are larger when the ﬁxed cost is high
relative to the size of the market because in this case the production ineﬃciency
associated with free trade is high.
Radical changes from the traditional results occur when a domestic ﬁrm is
active in an integrated market and the government can subsidize its production
(the remaining extreme case of a third market is analyzed in the companion pa 
per, Etro, 2011).3 Consider a market including domestic and foreign consumers:
in case of an exogenous number of foreign competitors the optimal policy can
be a tax or a subsidy to domestic production, depending on the form of compe 
tition (in prices or in quantities) and on the size of the domestic market relative
to the integrated one, but with endogenous entry of international ﬁrms, the
optimal policy is always a positive subsidy to domestic production, independent
from the size of the domestic country. The intuition relies on the fact that, in
3Our current analysis applies when export subsidies are forebidden, but subsidies to the
entire domestic production are possible. This is exactly what happens under the WTO rule.
2an integrated market with endogenous entry, the domestic consumer surplus is
indipendent from the domestic strategies and policies and remains anchored to
the entry process which drives proﬁts to zero for the international producers.
Nevertheless, the entry process is ineﬃcient, and the domestic ﬁrm can appro 
priate some rents when forced to act aggressively in the market, for instance
through a production subsidy. Since proﬁts are gained worldwide, the optimal
subsidy depends on the size of the integrated market, but not on the size of the
domestic one.
The investigation of EMSs in international trade theory has a number of pre 
cursors. The so called “reciprocal dumping” model started with Brander (1981)
and Brander and Krugman (1983) is the pathbreaking work in the analysis of
strategic interactions in intra industry trade, but it marginally considered the
case of endogenous entry and was developed in a Cournot model with homoge 
nous goods rather than in the general framework analyzed here.4 Horstmann
and Markusen (1992) focus on the entry decisions of just two multinationals in
two segmented national markets with competition in quantities and ﬁxed costs
of entry at the ﬁrm and plant level, characterizing how technological conditions
and trade policy induce switching between equilibria with a single ﬁrm or with
two ﬁrms. More recently, foreign direct investment in the presence of EMSs has
been studied by De Santis and Stahler (2004) who endogenize the number of
national and multinational ﬁrms active in two countries, and by Markusen and
St¨ ahler (2010) who investigate the impact of greenﬁeld investments by multina 
tionals and cross border acquisitions in markets with endogenous entry. Finally,
the Melitz (2003) model of trade with heterogenus ﬁrms has been extended to
strategic interactions by van Long et al. (2009), but welfare and policy isses
have not been addressed yet. The introduction of fully ﬂedged EMSs in the
literature on trade policy has been rather slow, since most of the many initial
contributions have been constantly focused on duopoly cases   only Venables
(1985) and Horstmann and Markusen (1986) analyzed trade policy for inter 
national markets with free entry of all ﬁrms, but they did not consider trade
policy for a domestic ﬁrm facing free entry of international competitors. In a
companion paper (Etro, 2011) I have analyzed strategic export promotion in a
third market with EMSs, applying the same principles to the analysis of export
subsidies, R&D subsidies and competitive devaluations. Contrary to that, here
I study the optimal trade policy for a domestic ﬁrm facing endogenous entry in
a domestic market and in an integrated market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces general models of
EMSs. Section 2 extends the linear demand model and the Krugman model to
4Lahiri and Ono (1995) have investigated a 2x2x2 model with Cournot competition and
endogenous entry in one sector, but limiting the analysis to the case of homogenous goods.
3strategic interactions with endogenous entry and characterizes the gains from
trade associated with the competition eﬀect. Section 3 is about trade policy for
the domestic market. Section 4 is about trade policy for an integrated market.
Section 5 develops few new applications. Section 6 concludes.
1 A general model of international EMSs
In this paper we analyze endogenous market structures that belong to a general
class introduced in Etro (2006, 2011). Consider a market whose size can be
measured with the number of identical consumers S, and where every ﬁrm bears
a ﬁxed entry cost F. Assume that each ﬁrm chooses a strategic variable x(i)
delivering the net proﬁt function:
πi = SΠ[x(i),βi, i] − F (1)
where the gross proﬁt per consumer Π[x(i),βi, i] depends on the aggregate
statistics of the strategies of the other ﬁrms βi =
 
j =i h(x(j)) for a positive
and increasing function h(x), and on a ﬁrm speciﬁc variable τi, which may be
a trade cost or a policy variable. We only assume that proﬁts are quasiconcave
in x(i), decreasing in βi and increasing in  i.5 Standard models of quantity
competition (with x(i) as the output level of ﬁrm i) and price competition
(with x(i) as the inverse of the price level) generate proﬁt functions that can be
described as above: our examples will be based on the cases of linear demand
and Dixit Stiglitz demand.
In the absence of ﬁrm speciﬁc heterogeneity ( i =   for any i), a general
characterization of Nash equilibria with endogenous entry is straightforward.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the ﬁrst order condition and the endogenous entry
condition deﬁne the equilibrium strategies x and number of ﬁrms n as follows:






It can be easily veriﬁed that an increase in the ratio between size of the
economy and ﬁxed entry cost S/F has ambiguous eﬀects on x and increases
the number of ﬁrms n. Moreover, as we will see in Section 2, in standard
models it also strengthens competition, reduces prices and increases less than
proportionally the number of ﬁrms. This is a crucial eﬀect that we expect from
opening up to trade with countries of size S∗ to create a market of size   S =
5We allow Π13 to be positive or negative: in the ﬁrst case, a policy increases marginal
proﬁtability. All forms of trade costs, subsidies or tariﬀs under quantity and price competition
imply Π13 > 0, but other indirect forms of export promotion can be characterized by Π13 < 0.
4S +S∗: integration tends to reduce the international mark ups and the number
of ﬁrms in each country, while increasing less than proportionally the total
number of ﬁrms active (and varieties produced) for the integrated market. We
provide some empirical evidence for this implication (against the implications
of the monopolistic competition approach) in the Appendix.
Let us assume, as it holds in a wide class of models nested in our speciﬁcation
(Anderson et al., 2010), that the consumer surplus of a representative agent u
is an increasing function of the aggregate statistics
 n
j=1 h(x(j)). Therefore,









For instance, under competition in quantities consumer surplus depends on total
production when the goods are homogenous and on a weighted sum of the pro 
duction levels with standard forms of product diﬀerentiation (as those derived
from CES preferences), and under competition in prices with standard demand
functions consumer surplus is decreasing in a properly deﬁned price index.
Since proﬁts are zero in a symmetric equilibrium with endogenous entry,
welfare corresponds to the consumer surplus Su[nh(x)]. This will be increas 
ing in the relative size of the integrated economy because of two eﬀects: the
increase in the number of ﬁrms n increases the number of goods produced (tra 
ditional gains from variety), and stronger competition due to market integration
reduces the prices and increases the consumption of each variety x (gains from
competition). However, the endogenous market structure is characterized by an
ineﬃcient allocation of production, typically due to excessive prices and entry:
this opens the door to a new role for trade policy.
Our simple model allows us to evaluate the impact of structural changes
or policy interventions for a domestic, foreign and integrated markets. Let
us consider a general market with a single domestic ﬁrm whose proﬁtability
is aﬀected by a speciﬁc parameter  , and many foreign ﬁrms whose entry is
endogenous and possibly aﬀected by a common parameter  ∗. Let us denote
with an asterisk the variables and the proﬁt functions of the foreign ﬁrms. In the
absence of prohibitive trade policies, the equilibrium strategies of the domestic
ﬁrm x and of the foreign ﬁrms x∗, and the total number of active ﬁrms n must
satisfy the optimality and endogenous entry conditions:
Π1[x,(n − 1)h(x∗), ] = 0 (4)
Π∗
1[x∗,(n − 2)h(x∗) + h(x), ∗] = 0 (5)






It follows (from the last two conditions) that the strategy of the foreign ﬁrms
x∗ depends on  ∗, but not on  . Most important, even the aggregate statistics
perceived by the foreign ﬁrms, β∗ = (n − 2)h(x∗) + h(x), depends on  ∗ but
not on  . As a consequence also the consumer surplus is independent from
 , because the aggregate statistics
 n
j=1 h(x(j)) = β∗ + h(x∗) depends on  ∗,
but does not change with  . On the other hand, the strategy of the domestic
ﬁrm x and the number of entrants n depend on both the structural or policy
parameters, which may aﬀect the proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm. We can informally
summarize our result as follows:
Theorem. Under endogenous market structures with competition
in quantities or prices, any structural or policy shift aﬀecting the
proﬁtability of a domestic ﬁrm is not going to change the domestic
consumers surplus and the strategies of the foreign ﬁrms, but changes
their number and the proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm.
Finally, notice that a change in the ratio between size of the economy and
ﬁxed entry cost S/F has the same impact as before on the equilibrium system
for the strategies of the foreign ﬁrms x∗, their aggregate statistics β∗ and, as
a consequence, for consumer surplus. This general framework can be used to
analyze the impact of trade in speciﬁc models and the impact of structural
changes between domestic and foreign ﬁrms and changes in the trade policy for
diﬀerent markets: a third market, as analyzed in the companion paper (Etro,
2011), a domestic market and an international integrated market (with both
domestic and foreign consumers), as analyzed here.
First of all, let us interpret the market as a domestic market of size S where
the government can choose an import tariﬀ  ∗ = t and a production subsidy
  = τ. Assuming that the subsidy is a pure transfer of domestic resources and
the tariﬀ revenue function R( ) is proportional to the aggregate statistics of the
foreign strategies (as in standard cases), welfare can be written as:
W(τ,t) = Su[(n − 1)h(x∗) + h(x)] + SΠ[x,(n − 1)h(x∗),0] − F + R[t(n − 1)h(x∗)]
(7)
where the endogenous variables derive from the equilibrium characterized above
and therefore from both policy tools, but the subsidy does not aﬀect consumer
surplus in line with our Theorem. The optimal tariﬀ balances the beneﬁts from
proﬁt shifting and tariﬀ revenues with the cost of the price increase. In Section
3 we derive the optimal policy in a special case of a linear Cournot model: as
6we will see, the optimal tariﬀ remains positive for proﬁt shifting reasons and is
inversely related to the ratio between size of the economy and ﬁxed entry cost
S/F. When available, the optimal subsidy must maximize the sum of domestic
proﬁts and revenues.
As a second application, let us think of an integrated market of size   S =
S + S∗ where the domestic ﬁrm is competing with international ﬁrms, and the
domestic government can choose the subsidy τ while the international ﬁrms face
an exogenous and common policy normalized at t = 0. The equilibrium must
satisfy the same conditions as above, therefore the domestic subsidy does not
aﬀect the strategies of the international ﬁrms and consumer surplus, in line with
our Theorem above. However, the subsidy reduces the number of ﬁrms n(τ) and
aﬀects the strategy of the domestic ﬁrm x(τ). If the subsidy is a pure transfer
of domestic resources, welfare can be written as:
W(τ) = Su[β∗ + h(x∗)] +   SΠ[x(τ),(n(τ) − 1)h(x∗),0] − F (8)
where the entire ﬁrst term is independent from the domestic policy and the
second term takes in consideration that the subsidy is a pure transfer or re 
sources (aﬀects proﬁts indirectly but not directly). As usual, the optimal sub 
sidy maximizes welfare taking into account the impact on the production or
pricing strategies of the rivals. In traditional models with exogenous entry in
a third country, this leads to a negative subsidy (an export tax) under price
competition (Eaton and Grossman, 1986) and to a positive subsidy only under
strategic substitutability (Brander and Spencer, 1985); when one considers an
integrated market including domestic consumers, the impact of the policy on
domestic consumer surplus tends to reduce the optimal tax or to increase the
optimal subsidy. In the case of endogenous entry, however, the production sub 
sidy does not aﬀect the production or pricing strategies of the competitors, but
only reduces their number, and, according to our Theorem above, does not af 
fect consumer surplus at home and abroad. Therefore, the optimal policy must
take into account only the impact on foreign entry in the integrated market and
its feedback on the domestic proﬁts. As we will see in Section 4, and contrary to
the traditional literature, this implies that it is always optimal to set a positive
subsidy to domestic production, independent from the form of competition and
from the relative size of the domestic market.
This same structure can be used to analyze a number of other issues in
international trade theory and policy. One is the role of a multinational with
cost advantages in a local market: according to our ﬁrst Theorem, its entry does
not aﬀect the strategies of the local ﬁrms but only their number, shifting proﬁts
to the multinationals. Other applications concern the optimality of diﬀerent
forms of indirect promotion of the domestic production, which can turn domestic
7ﬁrms into aggressive competitors abroad, or the analysis of lobbying on trade
policy. These applications will be examined in Section 5.
2 Competition eﬀect and welfare: examples
In this section we discuss two classic applications of the general framework with
EMS, based on a model with homogenous goods and linear demand ` a la Brander
(1981) and on the classic Krugman (1980) model extended to take into account
diﬀerent forms of strategic interactions between the ﬁrms. In both cases we
examine the impact of opening up to trade on competition and on welfare.
2.1 The case of linear demand
Let us start our examination of EMS from the only example which has been
examined in the trade literature, the one of homogenous goods (Brander and
Krugman, 1983). Consider an autarchic economy characterized by a market
with S consumers with utility:




with C consumption of a good produced by n imperfectly competitive ﬁrms and
Y is the numeraire which is produced under perfect competition. The demand
of the ﬁrst good is D = a−p where p is the equilibrium price. Total production
X = S(a − p) can be inverted to derive the inverse demand p = a − X/S. The
proﬁt function of each ﬁrm is:
πi = (a − X/S)xi − cxi − F (9)
where xi is its production and c is the constant marginal cost. This proﬁt
function is clearly nested in our general model. In Cournot equilibrium each
ﬁrm produces x = (a − c)S/(n + 1). When entry is endogenous the number of
ﬁrms is:





with individual production x =
√
SF and price:





Notice that welfare is U = Su = X2/2S, which is clearly increasing in the total
production and therefore decreasing in the equilibrium price.
8Consider opening up to trade with an other country characterized by iden 
tical agents and total population S∗, with   S = S + S∗ deﬁned as the size
of the integrated market. It is immediate to derive that the new equilib 
rium price is p = c +
 
F/  S which is reduced because of stronger competi 
tion in the integrated market. However, the total number of ﬁrms becomes
n + n∗ = (a − c)
 







−2. Trade has increased concentration in
the integrated market: this represents an example of beneﬁcial concentration,
because production becomes more eﬃcient thanks to the reduction of spend 
ing in ﬁxed costs. Consequently trade increases welfare (as in Brander and
Krugman, 1981).
However, the equilibrium characterized above is ineﬃcient, typically generat 
ing excessive mark ups and excessive business creation (Mankiw and Whinston,
1986): trivially, the ﬁrst best would require a single ﬁrm selling at the average
cost, but a second best taking strategic interactions into account would also re 
quire a smaller number of ﬁrms compared to (10). This ineﬃciency is the reason
for which the EMS approach gives rise to new implications for the impact of
structural and policy shocks and to a new role for trade policy.
2.2 The case of CES preferences
Let us move to the model with isoelastic preferences introduced by Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) and applied to trade theory by Krugman (1980). Consider a














where n is the number of goods and θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. Each
consumer maximizes utility under the budget constraint
 n
j=1 p(j)C(j) = 1,
where we normalize the wage and labor supply to unity. Each good i is produced
according to the linear production function x(i) = l(i), where l(i) is the labor
input used by ﬁrm i, with
 n
j=1 l(j) = S. Therefore, total sales correspond to
the size of the market S. Deﬁning total demand of each good as x(i) = C(i)S,
















9In both cases, the proﬁt function is nested in our general model and is associated
with a consumer surplus depending on the relevant aggregate statistics.6 Com 
petition in quantities or prices between ﬁrms determines the market structure.
In a symmetric equilibrium, each one of the n goods is produced in quantity
x, so that the utility of each agent is u = (x/S)n
θ
θ−1, which increases in the
number of goods and in the consumption of the agent.
The Krugman (1980) model and most of the subsequent literature ignore
the strategic interactions between ﬁrms, assuming monopolistic behavior. The
optimal price corresponds to a constant mark up on the unitary marginal cost




x = F for
each ﬁrm, we have the equilibrium production of each good x = F(θ − 1). The
number of ﬁrms can be derived from the resource constraint equating the value
of total sales and labor income npMx = S, or from the market clearing condition
for the labor market equating labor supply and labor demand, S = n(F + x).





Mark ups and production per ﬁrm are independent from the size of the economy
S, while the number of ﬁrms is directly proportional to it, a result that does
not ﬁnd empirical support, as we will suggest in the Appendix.
The fundamental contribution of the Krugman model is in the analysis of
market integration with other countries, which leads to intra industry trade of
the diﬀerentiated goods produced by each country, and to gains for the con 
sumers associated with an increase in the number of varieties available. For
instance, consider opening up to trade with a country with S∗ identical agents.
The proportional increase in total demand generates an equilibrium number of
varieties n+n∗ =   S/θ where   S is the population of the integrated market. The
price and the production of each ﬁrm remain the same as in the closed economy;
since C(i) = x/  S consumers reduce their consumption for each single variety.
2.2.1 Competition in quantities
Let us consider competition in quantities in the Krugman (1980) model. The
Cournot equilibrium is characterized by a price p = θn/(θ −1)(n−1), which is
clearly decreasing in the number of ﬁrms (and converging to the traditional one
only with inﬁnite ﬁrms).
For the sake of simplicity, we start our investigation in the extreme case
of homogenous goods (θ → ∞), in which the possibility of gains from variety
6Notice that consumer surplus depends on the aggregate statistics
 n
j=1 h(x(j)) with
h(x) = x1−1/θ. The proﬁt functions depend on the same aggregate statistics.
10is absent. Consider ﬁrst the equilibrium of a closed economy. Endogenous
















to what happens in the monopolistic framework, where price and production per
ﬁrm are independent from the domestic labor force, now the price is decreasing
in the labor force and the production of each ﬁrm is increasing in it to cover
the ﬁxed costs of entry. This result is due to a competition eﬀect associated
with the positive impact of the size of the market on the equilibrium number of






Notice that the number of ﬁrms is increasing and concave in the size of the econ 
omy, exactly as in the linear model   see(10). Finally, notice that consumption







Consider opening up to trade with an other country characterized by identi 
cal agents so that the population of the integrated market is   S. It is immediate







total number of ﬁrms becomes n+n∗ =
 
  S/F, which is lower than the number




S∗/F. Nevertheless, the strengthening of
competition in the integrated market leads to a lower international price level,
and to the larger production for each ﬁrm. Trade has reduced the total number
of ﬁrms, inducing an increase in world market concentration: in our case of ho 
mogenous goods, this represents an example of beneﬁcial concentration, because
production becames more eﬃcient thanks to the reduction of the spending in
ﬁxed costs.7
Of course, in case of imperfect substitutability between goods, product vari 
ety is beneﬁcial and the impact of trade is more complex, but the competition
eﬀect of trade on prices and the reduction in the equilibrium number of va 
rieties produced in each country persist. In particular, one can verify that a
7To clarify the implications of the EMSs approach for trade, let us consider the example of
two identical countries opening up to trade. Suppose that ten ﬁrms producing an homogenous
good are active in each country under autarchy. After the two countries open up to trade with
each other, the EMSs approach implies that only fourteen ﬁrms, seven in each country, remain
active. This implies that trade leads to the foreclosure of three ﬁrms in each country, which is
the consequence of a reduction of the mark up by about 30%. Formally, if n =
 
S/F = 10,
we must have n+n∗ = n
√
2 ≃ 14. Moreover, if the autarchic price was 1/(1−1/10), the new
one must be 1/(1 − 1/14), which is equivalent to a reduction of the mark up from 11.1% to
7.7%. This is a 30% reduction. Nevertheless, it is clear that trade increases utility because
the price of the homogenous good is reduced everywhere (and there is a more limited waste
of labor resources in ﬁxed costs).

























and an increase in the size of the economy leads to a reduction of the former
and to a less than proportional increase of the latter. This Cournot equilibrium
with endogenous entry is ineﬃcient compared to the Krugman equilibrium char 
acterized above because it generates higher mark ups and attracts an excessive
number of ﬁrms (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). As before, we can verify the
impact of opening up to trade. The equilibrium mark up decreases, which leads
to business destruction at the local level and to a larger production by each
surviving ﬁrm. The price reduction/business destruction eﬀect is reduced when
the degree of substitutability θ decreases.
Recent industrial organization research on markets with EMSs provides ev 
idence on the competition eﬀect outlined above (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1987,
Manuszak, 2002, and Campbell and Hopenhayn, 2005). Some novel empirical
evidence in support of the less than proportional relation between market size
and number of ﬁrms is provided in the Appendix, which provides an economet 
ric test of the structural relation (14) derived from the Krugman model and of
the alternative relations (15) or (17) derived from the EMS approach. Looking
at panel data from diﬀerent industries in the German manufacturing sector, we
show that a support of the EMS approach emerges quite clearly: estimating a
structural relation as lnn = β0 + β1 lnS + ε, the coeﬃcient β1 appears signiﬁ 
cantly lower than one and close to 0.5 (as predicted by the Cournot model with
homogenous goods).
2.2.2 Competition in prices
To conclude our extension of the Krugman model to strategic interactions,
let us consider competition in prices. The Bertrand equilibrium price is p =




(θ − 1)(S − F)
(18)








The equilibrium production level is x = F(θ − 1)(S − F)/[S + (θ − 1)F]: in
a larger economy there are more ﬁrms and the strengthening of competition
between them reduces the mark ups and increases the production of each ﬁrm.
Also in this case, the equilibrium is ineﬃcient, because of an excessive mark up
ue to the strategic interactions.
Consider now the opening up of this economy to trade. The new equilib 
rium is characterized by the price p = θ/(θ − 1)
 
1 − F/  S
 
, the total number
of varieties produced becomes n + n∗ =   S/θF + 1 − 1/θ and the individual
production levels are increased accordingly. In this case, opening up to trade
leads to a lower international price level without reducing the number of vari 
eties produced in each country (or reducing it by at most one unit if we take
in consideration the integer constraint on the number of ﬁrms), and increasing
the production of each one. However, once again the beneﬁcial impact of trade
emerges from both a price reduction and an increase of the number of available
varieties.
2.2.3 Welfare implications
The introduction of strategic interactions in the Krugman model has shown that
globalization can aﬀect the market structures in pervasive ways and induce new
sources of gains from trade. Summing up:
Proposition 1. Under endogenous market structures in the Krug-
man model, opening up to trade decreases the price level, increases
the production of each ﬁrm and (weakly) decreases the number of
ﬁrms in each country, so that the total number of consumed vari-
eties increases (less than) proportionally, with a beneﬁcial impact on
consumer welfare.
The relevance of the mechanism associated with the strategic interactions
depends on the type of traded goods under consideration. At one extreme we
have perfectly diﬀerentiated goods with competition in prices: for these goods,
all the gains from opening up to trade derive from an increase in the number
of consumed varieties and not from price changes, while business destruction
is absent. At the other extreme we have homogenous goods with competition
in quantities: for these, all the gains from trade derive from lower prices, but
business destruction is heavy. More importantly, the equilibria characterized
13above are ineﬃcient because of imperfect competition, which generates excessive
mark ups and excessive business creation (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). For
this reason, the EMS approach gives raise to new opportuinities for policy and
generates new implications for the optimal trade policy. To these implications
we turn in the next sections.
3 Import tariﬀs for domestic markets
In the theory of trade policy under imperfect competition, endogenous entry
has been considered only to study special cases and, in particular, the case of
monopolistic behavior in a model with two countries: in this setup Helpman and
Krugman (1989) have conﬁrmed the traditional optimality of a positive tariﬀ
for a large country with the purpose of improving the terms of trade. However,
most of the investigations are focused on models with an exogenous number
of domestic and foreign ﬁrms and on the incentives to adopt tariﬀs for proﬁt
shifting reasons (see Helpman and Krugman, 1989, and Bhattacharjea, 1995). In
this section we extend these investigations to the case of EMSs to characterize
the optimal import tariﬀ. For the sake of simplicity we develop most of the
analysis focusing on homogenous goods and competition in quantities. This
allows us to derive a new formula for the optimal import tariﬀ that is inversely
related to the ratio between the entry costs and the size of the market. Later on
we will discuss how the results can be extended to the case of CES preferences
and to the more general framework.
3.1 The case of linear demand
Let us consider the same linear model of competition in quantities of the previous
section, with n ﬁrms active in the domestic market: a domestic ﬁrm and n − 1
foreign ﬁrms. The government chooses a speciﬁc tariﬀ t on the imports of all
the foreign ﬁrms and possibly also a speciﬁc production subsidy τ on the sales
of a single national ﬁrm. With S domestic consumers, the inverse demand is
p = a−X/S where a represents the maximum willingness to pay. The marginal
cost of production is c and the ﬁxed cost is F. The proﬁt function of the
domestic ﬁrm is:
π = (a − X/S + τ)x − cx − F (20)
where x is its own production. The proﬁt function of a foreign ﬁrm i is:
π∗
i = (a − X/S − t)x∗
i − cx∗
i − F (21)
14where x∗
i is its production. In Cournot equilibrium the production levels are
respectively:
x(τ,t) =
a − c + (n − 1)t + nτ
1 + n
S and x∗(τ,t) =









for the international ﬁrms. With an exogenous number of ﬁrms, the proﬁt
maximizing tariﬀ (when τ = 0)8 can be derived as tH = 3(a − c)/(7 + n). The
role of this tariﬀ is to reduce foreign production while shifting proﬁts toward the
domestic ﬁrm and collecting some revenue, whose marginal beneﬁts are balanced
against the social marginal cost of the price increase. Notice that the optimal
tariﬀ does not depend on the size of the domestic market and of course not even
on the entry costs, but it increases with the size parameter a which measures
the maximum willingness to pay for the good and decreases with the marginal
cost of production c.
Now, imagine that entry of foreign ﬁrms in the domestic market is endoge 
nous. As long as there are foreign ﬁrms in the market and t + τ > 0, the zero
proﬁt condition must be binding on them, which implies:





with a production of the foreign ﬁrms x∗ =
√
SF, which is independent from




SF + (τ + t)S
therefore total production can be derived as:
X = (a − c − t)S −
√
SF (24)
Such an equilibrium is consistent with n ≥ 2 for t ≤ (a−c−τ −3
 
F/S)/2.
8If both instruments are available, welfare is maximized by ˜ t = 0 and ˜ s = a − c, that is by
setting the price equal to the marginal cost and driving out of the market all foreign ﬁrms.
See Bhattacharjea (1995) for further details.
15If this is the case, welfare becomes:
W(τ,t) =
 

























SF + (τ + t)S
 
      
Subsidy cost
(25)
where the subsidy does not aﬀect consumer surplus, in line with our ﬁrst The 
orem, but the import tariﬀs aﬀect all the components of welfare. For any given
small subsidy, and in particular in the case of no subsidy (when τ = 0), the






which is consistent with entry of some foreign ﬁrms as long as the ﬁxed cost is
small enough (otherwise, it is optimal to set the prohibitive tariﬀ). The optimal
tariﬀ does not depend anymore on the size parameter measuring the maximum
willingness to pay of the consumers and on the marginal cost of production.
Instead, it depends positively on the ﬁxed cost F and negatively on the size of
the domestic market S. Contrary to what happens in the model with exogenous
entry, the tariﬀ does not aﬀect the production of the foreign ﬁrms, which remains
the same. The main role of the tariﬀ is to reduce entry of these ﬁrms, which
reduces the production ineﬃciency associated with the free trade equilibrium  
due to the excessive price and entry ` a la Mankiw and Whinston (1986) examined
in the previous section. This creates space for increasing the market share and
the proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm (compared to the zero proﬁts of case with free
trade), while collecting also some tariﬀ revenue. These beneﬁts are larger when
the ﬁxed cost is high relative to the size of the market because in this case the
production ineﬃciency associated with free trade is high. In the limit case of
perfect competition (zero ﬁxed costs) we obtain the traditional result for which
free trade is optimal.
Finally, notice that welfare turns out to be a linearly increasing function of
the subsidy: therefore, if both the instruments are available, the ﬁrst best can
be obtained by setting ˜ t = 0 and ˆ τ = a − c.
The equilibrium production of the domestic ﬁrm is x = 2
√
SF, which is
twice as the production of the other ﬁrms, and the domestic proﬁts are π = 3F.
Total imports are IMP = (a − c)S − 4
√
SF, which delivers a tariﬀ revenue
R(t(n − 1)h(x∗)) = (a − c)
√
SF − 4F.
16It is important to remark that the same outcome could be obtained imposing
a quota Q = IMP and auctioning the rights to sell at a price tH: endogenous
entry of foreign producers would deliver the same allocation of production as
above.9
While the domestic economy gains from the positive proﬁts of the domestic
ﬁrm and from the revenue collected from the foreign ﬁrms, its consumers have
to face a higher equilibrium price:




compared to the one emerging under free trade, given by (11). Of course,
the reduction in consumer surplus is more than compensated by the gains in
domestic proﬁts and tariﬀ revenues.
When the size of the market becomes large, the optimal tariﬀ tends to zero,
a result that is consistent with the traditional idea that a free trade policy is
optimal when the domestic ﬁrms (her only one) are too small to aﬀect the terms
of trade. In general, we can state the following principle:
Proposition 2. Under endogenous market structures in the domes-
tic market, the optimal trade policy implies a positive import tariﬀ
(inversely related to the ratio between size of the economy and ﬁxed
entry cost) or a binding quota on imports so as to generate positive
proﬁts for the domestic ﬁrm.
3.2 The case of CES preferences
The nature of the optimal trade policy extends to the case of imperfect sub 
stitutability between products and competition in quantities, for instance with
inverse demand functions derived from CES preferences. In such a case it would
remain optimal to adopt a positive import tariﬀ to generate proﬁts for the do 
mestic ﬁrm and tariﬀ revenues from the foreign ﬁrms. Moreover, as long as
product diﬀerentiation and the taste for variety are strong enough, it would be
always optimal, even when subsidies to domestic production are available, to
allow for some entry of foreign varieties.
In a model of competition in prices with product diﬀerentiation, as that
derived from the CES preferences, it is also possible to show that domestic
welfare is maximized when the import tariﬀ and the subsidy maximize the sum
of tariﬀ revenue and the proﬁts of the national ﬁrm net of its subsidies, taking
9A smaller quota would ask a higher bidding price for the rights to sell, and would deliver
a diﬀerent equilibrium: the domestic ﬁrm would also reduce its production. However, it is
immediate to verify that the optimal quota reproduces the equilibrium with the optimal tariﬀ.
17into account that the number of foreign ﬁrms is endogenous and negatively
related to the tariﬀ. Despite a closed form solution is not available, in this case
it is still optimal to choose a non prohibitive tariﬀ on imports and (possibly) a
positive subsidy to domestic production.
It is important to remind the reader that we are referring to optimal unilat 
eral policies. As well known, also in this contest retaliation by foreign countries
by imposing similar import tariﬀs may lead to an ineﬃcient Nash equilibrium
trade policy. Moreover, keeping as neutral the policies of the foreign countries
for their exporting ﬁrms has implied a substantial loss of generality: these coun 
tries may have strong incentives to support their ﬁrms with consequences for
the domestic market as well. We now turn to the complementary issue of the
optimal policies that promote exports, which will deliver new policy recommen 
dations compared to the traditional outcomes.
4 Production subsidies for integrated markets
The neoclassical theory based on perfect competition associates the scope of
trade policy with improvements in the terms of trade (Lerner, 1934): as long
as a country is large enough to aﬀect it, the optimal unilateral policy is to set
a tax on exportable domestic production. The new trade theory associates the
scope of strategic trade policy with proﬁt shifting. Eaton and Grossman (1986)
have shown that the optimal unilateral policy is a tax on exportable domestic
production under price competition. Under quantity competition, a subsidy
to domestic production can be optimal only under certain conditions (Brander
and Spencer, 1985; Dixit, 1984). Moreover, when part of the production is
sold in the home country,10 the optimal policy must take in consideration also
the impact on the domestic consumer surplus: typically, this tends to bias the
optimal policy toward lower taxes or higher subsidies to reduce the prices, and
such a bias is stronger when the size of the domestic country is large relative to
the rest of the integrated market.
In this section we analyze the optimal unilateral policy for a market where
a domestic ﬁrm and international ﬁrms compete to serve integrated domestic
and international markets. We focus on the case of endogenous entry of in 
ternational ﬁrms and we characterize the optimal policy under quite general
conditions: this turns out to be a positive subsidy to the entire domestic pro 
duction independently from the form of competition and from the relative size
of the domestic country. We will now verify these results in a few examples.
10Our analysis applies when export subsidies are forebidden, but subsidies to the entire
domestic production are possible. This is exactly what happens under the WTO rule.
184.1 Competition in quantities
Consider a general model of competition in quantities with a speciﬁc subsidy.
Assuming a general inverse demand function and a general cost function, the
proﬁt function of ﬁrm i facing a speciﬁc subsidy τi is:
πi = x(i)[p(x(i),βi) + τi] − c(x(i)) − F (27)
where x(i) is its production and βi =
 
j =i h(x(j)), while c(x) is a positive
and increasing cost function. Let us focus on the case of a subsidy τ for the
domestic ﬁrm and no subsidy for the other ﬁrms. The equilibrium conditions
in the competition stage are:
p(x∗,β∗) + x∗p1(x∗,β∗) = c′(x∗), τ + p(x,β) + xp1(x,β) = c′(x)
(28)
where β∗ = (n−2)h(x∗)+h(x) is the spillover received by an international ﬁrm
from the strategies of all the other ﬁrms in the market and β = (n−1)h(x∗) is
the spillover for the domestic ﬁrm.
With a given number of ﬁrms the two conditions above deﬁne x∗(τ) and
x(τ). Comparative statics analysis shows that x∗′(τ) < 0 as long as strategic
substitutability holds, and x′(τ) < 0 always. The welfare function of the home
country can be expressed as the domestic consumer surplus, which depends on
both the equilibrium strategies, plus the domestic proﬁts net of the subsidy
costs. The optimal subsidy increases in the size of the total consumer surplus
and therefore in the relative size of the domestic economy.11
11As an example, consider the case of homogenous goods and linear demand p = a − X/  S
and cost. The number of domestic consumers is S = ϑ  S where ϑ ∈ [0,1] represents the relative
size of the domestic country. The Cournot equilibrium is given by:
x(τ) =
a − c + nτ
1 + n
  S and x∗(τ) =
a − c − τ
1 + n
  S
Domestic proﬁts are π = x(τ)2/  S − F for the domestic ﬁrm and the cost of the subsidy












− F − τx(τ)
whose maximization provides the optimal trade policy:
τ(n) =
[n(1 + ϑ) − 1](a − c)
2n − ϑ
> 0
When ϑ = 1 we are back in the case of a closed economy in which it is optimal to implement
the ﬁrst best production with the domestic ﬁrm. When ϑ = 0 we are in the case of a
third market analyzed by Brander and Spencer (1985) and the optimal subsidy becomes
τ(n) = (n − 1)(a − c)/2n. More generally, the optimal subsidy increases with the size of the
economy because the proﬁt shifting motive for subsidizing exports becomes less relevant and
19When entry is endogenous, the productive stage is characterized not only
by the optimality conditions for the domestic ﬁrm and for the representative
foreign ﬁrm, but also by the free entry condition:
x∗p(x∗,β∗) − c(x∗) = F (29)
The equilibrium system deﬁnes the output of each ﬁrm and the number
of ﬁrms as functions of the subsidy τ. We know from Proposition 3 that the
production of the foreign ﬁrms x∗ and their spillovers β∗ do not depend on the
subsidy, while x(τ) and β(τ) depend on it. Moreover, the domestic consumer
surplus U = Su[β∗ + h(x∗)] is independent from the subsidy. Therefore, we can
write the domestic welfare as:
W(τ) = Su[β∗ + h(x∗)]
      
Consumer surplus
+ x(τ)[p(x(τ),β(τ)) + τ] − c(x) − F
      
Domestic proﬁts
− τx(τ)
      
Subsidy cost (30)
where the ﬁrst term is policy independent. Welfare maximization entails an
interior solution for the optimal subsidy if goods are poor substitutes or if mar 
ginal costs are increasing enough (if this is not the case, a prohibitive subsidy is
optimal). Deriving the welfare maximizing production subsidy (and using the
ﬁrst order condition for the domestic ﬁrm) we obtain:
τH = −p2 (x,β)h′(x)x (31)
Notice that the optimal production subsidy is always positive and does not
depend on the relative size of the domestic country: it is the same whether the
ﬁrm is exporting its entire production or only a part of it.12 Nevertheless, the
optimal policy can depend on the size of the global market, as we will verify in
the examples below. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 3. Under endogenous entry in the integrated market
with competition in quantities, the optimal subsidy to domestic pro-
duction is always positive and independent from the relative size of
the domestic market.
In general, the upper bound for the optimal subsidy emerges in the case
of homogenous goods, which is consistent with a non prohibitive subsidy if the
marginal costs are increasing enough. Deﬁning the elasticity of demand as
ε ≡ −p/xp′, the optimal subsidy simpliﬁes to τH = p/ε. Therefore, under
the purpose of reducing domestic prices becomes more important. Notice that, for a given
size of the economy, the optimal subsidy is increasing in the number of international ﬁrms.
12However, notice that when the size of the country is large, as we have seen in the previous
section, there is an incentive to adopt an import tariﬀ on foreign production.
20perfect substitutability, the optimal subsidy as a percentage of the price of the
domestic ﬁrm is equal to the inverse of the elasticity of the international demand
to the price: the more elastic is demand the smaller is the optimal subsidy, and
this tends to zero when demand becomes inﬁnitely elastic.
4.1.1 The case of linear demand
As a further example of the homogenous goods case, consider the a linear de 
mand function p = a − X/  S together with a quadratic cost function c(x) =
x2/2.13 Looking at the Cournot equilibrium between n ﬁrms for a given sub 
sidy τ of the domestic ﬁrm, and imposing the free entry condition, we obtain
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(32)
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2 +   S
    S. The equilibrium production of the subsidized ﬁrm is:
x(τ) = x∗ +
τ   S
1 +   S
Consistently with Proposition 3, the subsidy does not aﬀect the individual pro 
duction of the other ﬁrms, but decreases their number. Moreover, consumer
surplus is now a function of the total production, which does not depend on
policy, u = (X/  S)2/2. Domestic proﬁts are:
πH =




τ   S
1 +   S
 2
− F
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13We focus on in creasing marginal costs becuase in case of a constant marginal cost we
would obtain the optimality of a prohibitive subsidy.
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> 0 (34)
This is approaching zero when the size of the market increases indeﬁnitely.
Notice also that when the ﬁxed cost of entry decreases, the level of concentration
in the market is reduced and the optimal subsidy goes down: in the limit case of
perfect competition (zero ﬁxed costs) we obtain the traditional result for which
free trade is optimal.
4.1.2 The case of CES preferences
Let us consider the usual isoelastic preferences (12), which lead to the inverse
demand:
p(x,β) =
x−1/θ   S
x1−1/θ + β
(35)
with h(x) = x1−1/θ. Applying directly the formula for the optimal production




which leads the domestic ﬁrm to sell its good at a price p = cθ/(θ − 1) lower
than the other ﬁrms. This allows us to rewrite the optimal export subsidy as:
τH =
p
   S/cx
  (36)
which is decreasing in the size of the international market   S. In other words,
large countries exporting in small markets (with small   S) should adopt large
subsidies for their exporting ﬁrms, while small open economies (exporting to
large markets) should tend to commit to free trade.
4.2 Competition in prices
Consider a general model of price competition with a speciﬁc subsidy τi for ﬁrm
i, such that its proﬁts are given by:
πi = (pi − c + τi)D(pi,βi) − F (37)
22where c is the constant marginal cost and the demand function is decreasing
in both arguments with βi =
 
j =i g(pj) for positive and decreasing functions
g(p): this implies that the demand for the domestic good is decreasing in its
price and increasing in all the other prices. Notice that by setting x = 1/p
and h(x) = g(1/x), the proﬁt function is nested in our general framework.
Substitutability between goods is guaranteed by the fact that the cross derivative
∂Di/∂pj ≡ ∆ij is always positive: ∆ij = D2g′(pj) > 0 for any i and j. The
gross proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm are:
Π = (p − c + τ)D(p,β) (38)
The ﬁrst order equilibrium conditions in the competition stage for the foreign
and domestic ﬁrms are:
(p∗ − c)D1(p∗,β) + D(p∗,β) = 0, (p − c + τ)D1(p,β) + D(p,β) = 0
(39)
where β∗ = (n−2)g(p∗)+g(p) is the spillover received by an international ﬁrm
from the strategies of all the other ﬁrms in the market and β = (n − 1)g(p∗)
is the spillover for the domestic ﬁrm. This system provides the prices and the
number of ﬁrms as functions of the subsidy τ and the number of ﬁrms n, with
p′(τ) < 0 and p∗′(τ) < 0. This implies that, in case of exogenous entry in a third
market, the optimal policy under price competition requires a tax on domestic
production, as ﬁrst suggested by Eaton and Grossman (1986). However, taking
into account the negative impact of the tax on domestic consumer surplus can
reduce the optimal tax or turn it into a production subsidy if the relative size
of the domestic economy is large.
When entry is endogenous, beyond the ﬁrst order conditions above, we need
to take into account the free entry condition:
(p∗ − c)D(p∗,β∗) = F (40)
Our ﬁrst Theorem tells us that the price of the foreign ﬁrms p∗ and their spillover
β∗ do not change with the subsidy, while the price of the domestic ﬁrm p(τ)
and its spillover β(τ) depend on the subsidy. Moreover, since consumer surplus
depends on the aggregate statistics
 n








 = u[β∗ + g(p∗)]
which is independent from the subsidy. Therefore, we can write total welfare of
23the domestic country as:
W(τ) = Su[β∗ + g(p∗)]
      
Consumer surplus
+ [p(τ) − c + τ]D[p(τ),β(τ)] − F
      
Net domestic proﬁts
− τD[p(τ),β(τ)]
      
Subsidy cost(41)
where the ﬁrst term is policy independent. Let us deﬁne ∆(p,β) = D2 (p,β)g′(p)
as the indirect eﬀect that a price change exerts on demand through the change
in the endogenous number of ﬁrms. Deriving the welfare function with respect
to the production subsidy and using the equilibrium ﬁrst order condition for the





The optimal subsidy to domestic production is always positive and depends
on the impact of a price change on the entry of competitors (∆(p,β)): the
stronger is this eﬀect (for instance because goods are close substitutes), the
larger should be the optimal subsidy. Moreover, the optimal susbidy does not
depend on the relative size of the domestic economy. It is the same whether the
domestic country exports its entire production or only part of it. The reason is
that proﬁts are gained worldwide, while the consumer surplus is not aﬀected by
the subsidy. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 4. Under endogenous entry in the integrated market
with competition in prices, the optimal subsidy to domestic produc-
tion is always positive and independent from the relative size of the
domestic market.
We can also notice that the optimal subsidy as a percentage of the price of
the domestic ﬁrm must be smaller than the inverse of the demand elasticity,
which was the optimal subsidy under competition in quantities: in other words,
the inverse of the demand elasticity represents an upper bound for the size of
the optimal export subsidy.
4.2.1 The case of CES preferences





with g(p) = p1−θ. Under the optimal policy, the equilibrium price of the do 
mestic ﬁrm must be p = θc/(θ − 1), exactly as in the case of competition in
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− 1
  > 0 (44)
which is again decreasing in the size of the international market.
5 Applications of the EMS approach
In this section we adopt the EMS approach to examine traditional trade issues.
We start with an analysis of the role of multinationals active in international
markets, then we move to the role of lobbying in aﬀecting trade policy for
international markets and ﬁnally we evaluate the impact of policies of indirect
export promotion.
5.1 Application I: Multinationals and FDIs
Our modeling approach to global markets with endogenous market structures
can be used for many investigations. One concerns the strategies of multina 
tionals with superior technologies deciding the form of foreign direct investment
(FDI) in international markets.
To evaluate the impact of FDIs by multinationals with lower production
costs in a third market, we can apply our ﬁrst Theorem, for which any ex 
ogenous change in the proﬁt function of domestic ﬁrm is not going to aﬀect
the equilibrium strategies of all the other ﬁrms, but only their number. As a
consequence, we can immediately evaluate the consequence of the entry of a
multinational in a foreign market with a direct (greenﬁeld) investment, which
requires to build a new factory that produces at a lower marginal cost than the
local competitors: such an entry would induce exit of other local ﬁrms. Contrary
to this, the acquisition of a local ﬁrm with the same cost structure of the other
local ﬁrms would not induce this eﬀect. Therefore, one can verify that such a
cross broder acquisition would be preferred to the direct investment only if the
ﬁxed cost of the latter is high enough or the sinergies from the merger are high
enough. In both cases, the investment would be proﬁtable for the multinational
ﬁrm, without changing the strategies of the other ﬁrms and (under homogenous
goods and Cournot competition or under our examples of Bertrand competition)
without aﬀecting welfare in the importing country.
25We can summarize the main results of this application as follows:
Proposition 5. Under endogenous entry in the international mar-
ket, a direct investment by a more eﬃcient multinational ﬁrm or a
cross-border acquisition of a less eﬃcient local ﬁrm would not aﬀect
the strategies of the rivals and local welfare, but the ﬁrst strategy
would reduce the number of rivals and it would be chosen if the
ﬁxed cost of the investment or the sinergies from the merger are low
enough.
Markusen and St¨ ahler (2010) have analyzed this issue looking at linear
Cournot models and comparing the results with exogenous and endogenous en 
try. In line with our results, they ﬁnd that, with an exogenous market structure,
a greenﬁeld investment implies an increase in aggregate output and a decrease in
output and proﬁts of the local ﬁrm, but in the long run, when the market struc 
ture can be regarded as endogenous, aggregate output does not change and some
local ﬁrms exit from the market, generating larger proﬁts for the multinational
compared to the ﬁxed market structure. In case of an acquisition, Markusen
and St¨ ahler (2010) have assumed Nash bargaining in the merger: with a ﬁxed
market structure, the acquisition of a local ﬁrm reduces aggregate output and
increases output and proﬁts of the local ﬁrms, but with an endogenous market
structure, additional entry reduces the proﬁts for the multinational compared
to the ﬁxed market structure. In the same spirit, they have also analyzed the
choice between FDIs and exports for the multinational.14
5.2 Application II: Lobbying for production subsidies
It is widely claimed that trade policy is often determined by lobbying activity
of special interest groups rather than by welfare maximizing politicians. In this
section we study the way in which ﬁrms that are targets for subsidies to domestic
production in an integrated market can aﬀect trade policy through rent seeking
activities (similar conclusions apply to the case of lobbying for import tariﬀs).
Deﬁne C(τ) = C [z(τ),β(τ),τ] as a reduced form for the social cost of the
policy, which we assume increasing and convex: for instance, in case of subsidies,
this is the tax revenue necessary to ﬁnance them. The optimal policy studied
14Their main ﬁnding is that greenﬁeld entry and exporting options are more attractive
relative to acquisition when the local market structure adjusts to foreign entry through local
entry or exit than when it is ﬁxed. The entering foreign ﬁrm may do better or worse under
endogenous entry versus a ﬁxed market structure depending on its optimal choice under the
latter assumption.
26in Section 4 is the one that maximizes W(τ) = Su +   SΠ − C(τ), and satisﬁes
the ﬁrst order condition (dΠ/dτ)   S = C′(τH).
Here we want to extend this basic model to take into account the lobbying
activity of the domestic ﬁrm (exporters represent a minoritarian but well orga 
nized part of the society). Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), the easiest
way to endogenize lobbying is to imagine that the government chooses its policy
to maximize a weighted average of welfare and ﬁrm’s proﬁts:
τ = argmax
 
(1 − λ)W(τ) + λ  SΠ
 
= argmax
   SΠ + (1 − λ)[Su − C(τ)]
 
where λ is the weight given to the proﬁts of the ﬁrm, which will be endogenized
later. Given λ, the equilibrium policy satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition:
dΠ
dτ
  S = (1 − λ)C′(τ) (45)
which delivers a subsidy τH(λ) increasing in λ, that is in the weight given by
the politician to the ﬁrm’s proﬁts in its objective function, and equal to the
optimal one if this weight is zero (τH(0) = τH). However, as shown by our ﬁrst
Theorem and the analysis of Section 4, the equilibrium subsidy is not going
to aﬀect consumer surplus in any way: the outcome of the lobbying activity in
markets with endogenous entry is to reduce entry of international ﬁrms and shift
proﬁts toward the domestic one without consequences for the utility of domestic
consumers. In particular, if the revenue to ﬁnance the subsidy can be collected
with lump sum taxes, the lobbying activity does not create any welfare loss, but
a pure transfer of resources toward the domestic ﬁrm.
Let us look at lobbying for subsidies in the model with Cournot competition
and homogeneous goods and general cost functions. Under endogenous entry,
assuming that the elasticity of the marginal cost σ = c′′(x)x/c′(x) > 0 is high
enough to have an interior solution, the politico economic equilibrium subsidy





1 + λ + λσ(1 − ε)/ε
1 − λ − λσ
 
(46)
When λ = 0 we are back to the welfare maximizing production subsidy τH(0) =
p/ε, which is a particular case of (31) when goods are homogenous, otherwise
the equilibrium subsidy is larger and increasing in σ. Summing up:
Proposition 6. Under endogenous entry in an integrated market
and lobbying by domestic producers, the politico-economic equilib-
rium subsidy is increasing in the weight that politicians give to do-
mestic producers but does not aﬀect domestic consumer surplus.
27Finally, the lobbying activity by the exporting ﬁrm determines λ, and this
framework provides a simple way to understand the beneﬁts of lobbying. If the
cost of the lobbying activity to obtain a weight λ in the objective function of
the politician is L(λ), which is assumed increasing and convex, the investment
in lobbying will select λ to maximize   SΠ − L(λ). The ﬁrst order condition is
(dΠ/dτ)   Sτ′
H(˜ λ) = L′(˜ λ), and using (45) it allows us to derive a more informative
expression for the equilibrium lobbying:





The right hand side contains the ratio between the marginal cost of lobbying for
the exporting ﬁrm, and the product of the marginal cost of subsidization with
the derivative of the policy with respect to λ, which is just the social marginal
cost of lobbying.
Similar results can be derived for the case of competition in prices. The
bottom line is that even if there is a strategic incentive to promote domes 
tic output, lobbying activity induces excessive promotion. If this distortion is
strong, a commitment to free trade may be still optimal for domestic welfare.
5.3 Application III: Indirect trade promotion
The general principles on the optimal subsidization of the domestic production
can be applied to other policies which increase demand for the domestic products
in an indirect way, for instance international advertising of domestic products,
public support of domestic supplies abroad and so on. As before, the results
depend crucially on the way a policy aﬀects the marginal proﬁtability, and
generalize those found by Etro (2006, Prop. 3, p. 154) for general demand 
enhancing investments.15 In particular, when the policy increases the demand
for the domestic goods (without making it too rigid), one can show the following
result:
Proposition 7. Under endogenous entry in the international mar-
ket, overinvestment (underinvestment) in promotion of domestic pro-
duction is always optimal with competition in quantities (prices).
The ambiguity of the direction of the optimal policy depends on the fact
that demand enhancing policies have an impact on the strategic attitude of the
domestic ﬁrms which depends on the form of competition.
15In our terminology, the results depend on the sign of Π13 deﬁned as the derivative of the
marginal proﬁts with respect to the investment in trade promotion.
28Other forms of indirect export promotion can aﬀect the supply side. In a
context of international trade, transport costs are crucial since the marginal
cost of exports depend on them. The government can implement policies to
reduce transport costs for all the exporting ﬁrms. A main example is given
by investments in infrastructures for international communication, but more
indirect examples include the establishment of easier business connections with
other countries, the reduction of bureaucracy for export duties and even the
development of trade unions and currency unions to reduce import tariﬀs and
uncertainty costs related with the exchange rate. Applying the principles found
by Etro (2006, Prop. 2, p. 153), one can show that there may or may not be
a strategic incentive to reduce transport costs when there are barriers to entry
abroad, but under endogenous entry this incentive always exists:
Proposition 8. Under endogenous entry in the international mar-
ket, overinvestment in reduction of transport costs is always optimal.
Finally, even forms of the infant industry argument can be defended (only)
under special circumstances on the basis of our theory: if initial overproduction
can reduce production costs and create a comparative advantage in this sense,
it may be optimal to close the domestic sector from the competition of interna 
tional ﬁrms so as to develop a cost eﬀective domestic industry able to compete
in the international market in the future.
6 Conclusion
We studied international trade theory in the presence of endogenous market
structures characterized by both strategic interactions and endogenous entry.
The theoretical analysis has emphasized that globalization leads to lower prices
and to fewer, but larger, ﬁrms. This increase welfare but leads to an ineﬃcient
organization of production in the global production. For this reason we have
revisited the role of trade policy in the presence of endogenous entry in domestic
and integrated markets with competition in prices and quantities. We have
shown that the traditional bias in favor of a positive import tariﬀ holds for
a large country, but the role of the tariﬀ is to reduce entry of foreign ﬁrms
(rather than their individual production) and collect revenue to compensate for
the price increase. The optimal tariﬀ is decreasing in the ratio between the
size of the domestic market and the ﬁxed costs of entry. We have also analyze
the optimal policy on the domestic production for an integrated market (when
export subidies are forebidden), and we have shown that the bias in favor of
taxes collapses: positive subsidies to domestic production are always optimal.
Finally, we have argued that the analysis of international endogenous market
29structures can shed light on many other issues, including the political economy
of trade policy, the role of multinationals and forms of indirect trade promotion.
Appendix: Evidence on Market-size Eﬀects
In this Appendix we provide some microeconometric evidence in support
of the EMSs approach, and we argue that this evidence is in line with one of
its main implications for international trade theory, the eﬀect of opening up to
trade with new markets on the production structure, and in particular on the
number of ﬁrms.16
In the text we have emphasized the diﬀerent implications of the model of
monopolistic behavior with endogenous entry ` a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and
Krugman (1980) and of the EMSs approach. A clear distinction emerges for the
relation betwen the size of the market and the number of ﬁrms in each sector.
Both the Krugman Dixit Stiglitz approach and the EMSs approach generate a
positive correlation between market size and the number of ﬁrms, however the
relation is linear in the former case and it is typically concave in the latter.
This has a crucial implication: according to the Krugman Dixit Stiglitz frame 
work with monopolistic behavior, it takes a market of double size to double the
number of ﬁrms, while under competition in quantities and endogenous entry
` a la Brander (1981) the size of the market must be more than double for the
number of ﬁrms to be twice as much. The modern empirical literature on EMSs
has investigated the relation between market size and entry in local markets.
The pathbreaking work in the ﬁeld by Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) has studied
professional and retail markets in small and isolated U.S. towns providing a
certain support for the EMSs approach. Stronger evidence derives from the re 
cent works by Manuszak (2002) and Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) through
the analysis of cross sectional data at the industry level. Here we provide addi 
tional support through a more general panel data analysis looking at diﬀerent
industries over time.
We estimate the following structural relation between number of ﬁrms njt in
sector j at time t and the market size Sjt of the same sector at the same time:
lnnjt = β0j + β1 lnSjt + εjt (48)
where εjt is an error term. The Krugman Dixit Stiglitz model implies β1 = 1,
as can be veriﬁed from (14), whose linearization is:
lnn = lnS − lnF − lnθ
16This Appendix is entirely based on joint work with Dirk Czarnitzki. I share with him the
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Figure 1: Number of ﬁrms and Market Size for German industries (from regres 
sions). NACE 3 digit level.
Bertrand competition with endogenous entry leads to approximately the same
results. Instead, Cournot competition with endogenous entry ` a la Brander
(1981) implies β1 ∈ [0.5,1), with a coeﬃcient that should decrease with the
degree of substitutability between products. In particular, in case of homoge 
nous goods we have β1 = 0.5, as can be veriﬁed from (15),17 whose linearization
is:
lnn = 0.5(lnS − lnF)
On this basis we can test the Krugman Dixit Stiglitz hypothesis and compare
it with the predictions of the Cournot model.
One can also check the relation between concentration and market size.
Common indexes of market concentration can be highly criticized as a measure
of market power, nevertheless we used the HHI of concentration for robustness
analysis. This index corresponds to the sum of the squared market shares, and
in the case of symmetric competition it becomes HHIjt = (1/njt) 1000, there 
17Notice that a strategic model in which mark ups depend on the number of ﬁrms (nega 
tively) and on the market size (positively) in more general ways could rationalize β1 < 0.5.
Endogenizing the ﬁxed costs of entry, one could even reach a non monotone relation between
size and number of ﬁrms ` a la Sutton (1991). Moroever, one could interpret market structure
indeterminacy associated with perfect competition with β1 = 0 (no relation between size and
number of ﬁrms).
31fore we would expect an inverse relation compared to that found for the number
of ﬁrms.
Our preliminary investigation of the relation between market size and num 
ber of ﬁrms is based on a panel of industry level data for the German manu 
facturing sector. The data stem from the bi annual oﬃcial publications of the
German Monopolies Commission, that publishes regularly concentration statis 
tics for competition policy purposes. This data source contains the number of
ﬁrms, total industry sales, which we adopt as a measure of market size, and the
HHI index for German manufacturing for diﬀerent aggregations of the Euro 
pean standard industry classiﬁcation called NACE. In the following, we utilize
data at the NACE 3 digit level, which results in 102 diﬀerent manufacturing
industries. We have bi annual data between 1991 and 2003. Table 1 shows the
summary statistics of the number of ﬁrms, njt, the total industry sales, Sjt,
that we use as market size variable, and the Herﬁndahl Index, HHIjt.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (711 observations, 102 industries)
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
njt 387 540 1 3851
Sjt 22456.38 34878.98 31.99 38569.31
HHIjt 84.05 141.75 3.15 2431.14
We estimate three diﬀerent panel models. First, we estimate a pooled cross 
sectional OLS regression (POLS) where we implicitly assume that β0j = β0 for
any j. This is then relaxed by estimating two ﬁxed eﬀects models. We allow
β0j to be industry speciﬁc by applying the within panel regression (FE: Within)
and by estimating a ﬁrst diﬀerence model (FE: FD). The results are displayed
in Table 2. Standard F tests conﬁrm the presence of industry speciﬁc β0j, so
that the POLS models are rejected. Consequently, we should turn our attention
to the ﬁxed eﬀects models. In the regression concerning the number of ﬁrms, we
ﬁnd that the slope of market size is positive and signiﬁcant in both the within
and the FD regression. The Krugman Dixit Stiglitz hypothesis that β1 = 1 is
clearly rejected in both models, with respectively F = 22.9∗∗∗ and 27.69∗∗∗.
Fig. 1 plots the (log) number of ﬁrms of the industries against the (log)
sales per industry, here on the basis of the within regression. The 45◦ dashed
line represents the hypothetical relation between number of ﬁrms and size that
emerges from the Krugman Dixit Stiglitz approach (β1 = 1), while the ﬂatter
dashed line is the relation that emerges from the EMSs approach in case of
Cournot competition with homogenous goods (β1 = 0.5). We expect that the
data lie between these two extreme predictions, and this is exactly what we
ﬁnd out. The Krugman Dixit Stiglitz approach is rejected, meaning that there
is a robust positive but less than proportional relation between the size of the
32market and the number of ﬁrms. The estimates for β1 in the within and ﬁrst 
diﬀerence model are respectively β1 = 0.650 (the case of Fig. 1) and β1 = 0.507
(which in Fig. 1 could not be distinguished from the ﬂatter dashed line): this
suggests that the EMSs model with Cournot competition and homogenous goods
is a better approximation to the data (indeed, the hypothesis β1 = 0.5 cannot
be rejected in both models). The results are conﬁrmed when we group ﬁrms
in macrosectors (ICT, machinaries, chemicals, paper, metal, food  and textile 
related industries) with the Krugman Dixit Stiglitz hypothesis rejected always
except for textile related sectors. Finally, notice that even without controlling
for other variables, our basic results are quite powerful, with R2 around 50%.18
Table 2. Regression Results
POLS FE: Within FE: FD
Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.) Coef. (Std. err.)
Regression of lnNjt on lnSjt
β1 0.611 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.650 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.507 (0.09)∗∗∗
Obs. 711 711 609
R2 0.45 0.56 0.43
Note: Each regression includes a full set of time dummies. They are always signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. *** (**, *) indicate a signiﬁcance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
The regressions on the HHI show a weaker relation with market size, but
they nevertheless identify a negative slope much lower than one, again in con 
tradiction with the Dixit Stiglitz hypothesis.
We have also veriﬁed the robustness of our results with diﬀerent datasets,
always for the German manufacturing sector, obtaining similar patterns. Fig.
2 reports the basic within panel regression based on data at the NACE 4 
digit level from the annual “Kostenstrukturerhebung” published by the German
Federal Statistical Oﬃce (235 groups bewteen 1995 and 2006 for a total of 2695
observations). The results are in line with the earlier ones, except for one
diﬀerence: when we look at more disaggregated data, the estimated coeﬃcient
β1 decreases, here to β1 = 0.40. This may support another implication of
the EMSs approach: a higher degree of substitutability, that we ﬁnd at more
disaggregated levels in the data, changes the relation between market size and
number of ﬁrms and reduces the associated coeﬃcient.
This preliminary investigation supports the idea that an increase in the size
of a market, due for instance to the integration with a formerly separate market,
leads to a less than proportional increase in the number of ﬁrms, to lower mark
ups and to a larger production for each ﬁrm. Further research should try to
18The results are not driven by the dynamic framework: similar coeﬃcients emerge in cross 
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Figure 2: Number of ﬁrms and Market Size for German industries (from regres 
sions). NACE 4 digit level.
verify whether these results are supported in other countries or datasets, and,
most of all, try to check directly the impact of diﬀerent measures of openness
on the structure of markets.
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